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I. INTRODUCTION
Horizontal "privity"1 in a breach of warranty lawsuit refers to non-
purchasing plaintiffs who are outside the chain of distribution between the
original seller and ultimate purchaser. 2 Section 2-318 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("U.C.C.") extends warranty coverage on the sale of goods to
such non-purchasing plaintiffs and permits them to sue as third-party benefi-
* Author received her B.S. in Public Relations from the University of Florida and is a
2006 J.D. Candidate from Nova Southeastern University. She would like to thank her family,
Bryan Weinsztok, and friends for their love and support during the writing of this article. She
also would like to thank Professor Michael Richmond for sparking her interest on this topic.
1. See generally BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES 10.01 (1984) (defining privity as "a direct contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant, and reflects the fact that warranty is at least partly based upon notions
of contract").
2. Id.at 10.01[l].
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ciaries to a purchaser's warranties.3 Titled "Third Party Beneficiaries of
Warranties Express or Implied," section 2-318 provides three alternatives for
states to adopt and gives plaintiffs standing in a breach of warranty action.4
Most jurisdictions have adopted Alternative A,5 which limits the extension of
a "seller's warranty whether express or implied . ..to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods."6 Since most Alternative A jurisdictions only extend warranty
protection to the class of persons specifically mentioned in section 2-318,
employees are generally denied beneficiary standing, because they are not
among the protected class of a seller's warranties.7 However, the ambiguous
language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318 allows the state's judiciary
to expand warranty protection beyond the enumerated list.8 Since Official
Comment 3 to section 2-318 literally states that the section is "neutral" be-
yond providing warranty protection to the enumerated class, and since it
permits the courts to decide emerging issues of privity, courts interpreting
the section as "neutral" to extending warranty coverage beyond the pur-
3. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2001).
4. Id. Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. provides:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to
the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
Id.
5. 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-318:2 (2001).
Alternative A has been adopted in ... Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Id.
6. § 2-318.
7. Diane L. Schmauder, Annotation, Third-Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under
UCC § 2-318, 50 A.L.R.5th 327, 349 (1997).
8. John F. Kamin, Note, The Extension of Implied Warranty Protection to Employees of
a Purchaser; Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 156 1ll. App. 3d 316 509 N.E.2d 591 (1st
Dist. 1987), 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 125 (1989).
2
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chaser's family, household, and houseguests afford third-party beneficiary
standing to employees.9
Out of all jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative A, only Florida
has expanded the list of third-party beneficiaries by amending section
672.318 of the Florida Statutes to expressly extend warranty coverage to an
"employee, servant or agent of his or her buyer."'" Since jurisdictions are
split regarding whether employees should receive warranty protection under
Alternative A, this article will survey and analyze various jurisdictions that
afford or deny employees standing as third-party beneficiaries to their em-
ployer's warranties. Part II of this article will provide an overview of section
2-318. Part III will analyze section 2-318, Alternative A and evaluate the
class of potential plaintiffs who can recover against a seller for breach of
warranty. Further, Part IV will analyze section 672.318 of the Florida Stat-
utes. Part V will explore the case law of jurisdictions that deny warranty
coverage to employees under section 2-318, Alternative A. Part VI will pre-
sent case law of jurisdictions allowing employees to recover against a seller
for breach of warranties. Finally, Part VII will evaluate whether employees
should be considered third-party beneficiaries under Alternative A and offer
solutions to bring uniformity among the jurisdictions.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.C.C. SECTION 2-318
The original version of section 2-318 was enacted in 1952 and provided
warranty protection for the buyer's family, household, and house guests."
The purpose of the U.C.C. was "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.' 2 However, the states viewed this version as a limitation on
the realm of potential plaintiffs who could sue a seller for breach of warran-
ties. 13 As a result, many states adopted their own versions and variations of
section 2-318.'4 In response to the states' rampant opposition and changes to
section 2-318, the drafters of the section amended section 2-318 in 1966 to
offer the states three alternatives. 5 The 1952 version became Alternative A,
Alternative B was added to extend the class of potential plaintiffs beyond the
enumerated class in Alternative A, and Alternative C was added for an even
more liberal approach to allow non-privity plaintiffs to sue as third-party
9. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
10. FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (2004).
11. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 10.01[2][b].
12. 1 I-AWKLAND, supra note 5, at § 2-318:1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. § 2-318.
2005]
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beneficiaries of warranties.16 Official Comment 2 to section 2-318 was
added to illustrate the drafter's intent and stated:
The purpose of this section is to give certain beneficiaries the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the con-
tract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any tech-
nical rules as to "privity." It seeks to accomplish this purpose
without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negli-
gence. It rests primarily upon the merchant-seller's warranty 17 un-
der this Article that the goods sold are merchantable and fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used rather than the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 18 Implicit in the sec-
tion is that any beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action
for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to
him. 19
Although code commentaries are not authoritative law for courts to ap-
ply, they are both helpful and compelling when construing the provisions.2"
Official Comment 3 to section 2-318 addresses the privity issue by stating:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
16. Id.
17. U.C.C. section 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchant-
able is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quan-
tity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade.
§ 2-314.
18. U.C.C. section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under [section 2-316] an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
§ 2-315.
19. § 2-318 cmt. 2.
20. Kamin, supra note 8.
[Vol. 29:3:721
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enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain.2' The second alternative is designed for
states where the case law has already developed further and for
those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries. The third al-
ternative goes further, following the trend of modem decisions as
indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A ... in extending the
rule beyond injuries to the person.22
Alternative A limits the class of persons who can be in "horizontal priv-
ity"23 but leaves issues of "vertical privity" 24 for the courts to determine on a
case-by-case basis.25 Alternative B eliminates both horizontal and vertical
privity in regard to "natural person[s] who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who [are] injured in person by
breach of the warranty. 26 Alternative C takes an even more liberal approach
by affording warranty protection to "any person who may reasonably be ex-
pected to use, consume or be affected by the goods" and allowing recovery
for pure economic loss.27  In adopting one of the alternatives provided by
section 2-318, a state's legislature has established its sphere of horizontal
privity. 8
III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE A
Recall that Alternative A states:
21. See § 2-103. The term "distributive chain" is not defined in § 2-103. Id. Therefore,
it is unclear whether "distributive chain" refers to those who are in vertical or horizontal priv-
ity with the buyer. William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-
Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-
318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1215, 1258 (1993).
22. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1999).
23. 3A LARy LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 324 (3d ed.
2002). "'Horizontal privity' addresses the issue as to whether a seller is liable to persons,
other than the buyer, who use the goods." Id.
24. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 742 (1996). Vertical privity "includes all parties
in the distributive chain from the initial supplier of the product to the ultimate purchaser." Id.
25. 3A LAWRENCE, supra note 23. See generally Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509
N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
26. § 2-318, Alternative B.
27. § 2-318, Alternative C. "[I]n a products-liability suit, economic loss includes the cost
of repair or replacement of defective property, as well as commercial loss for the property's
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (2d
Pocket ed. 2001).
28. See Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
2005]
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A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
29
clude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative A limits the class of potential plaintiffs in five ways.3" First,
the section only extends warranty protection to "natural persons."'" This
means that corporations, partnerships, and businesses cannot recover under
Alternative A.32 Second, the section only allows recovery if the plaintiff
sustains a personal injury.33 Therefore, non-purchasing plaintiffs cannot re-
cover under Alternative A if they only sustained an economic loss. Third,
the language of Alternative A limits the class of non-privity plaintiffs to
those who are in the buyer's family, household, or guests in his home.34 In
adopting Alternative A, a state's legislature indicates an intention to only
extend warranty coverage to the limited classes included in the statute.3 5
Therefore, a buyer's employees are not likely to recover in an Alternative A
jurisdiction since they are not among the third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters of the Code. Fourth, Alternative A limits the class of
defendants to direct sellers by expressly stating that the seller's warranty
extends to any natural person "of his buyer. 3 6 However, Official Comment
3 has been interpreted to give courts the discretion to resolve issues of verti-
cal privity and expand the potential class of defendants. 37 Further, the last
sentence of Alternative A, stating that "[a] seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section, '31 forbids the "exclusion of liability by the seller to
the persons to whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would
extend under this section. ' 39 Finally, Alternative A narrows the class of po-
tential plaintiffs by only allowing the enumerated class to recover if it is
29. § 2-318, Alternative A.
30. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 5, at 2-318:1, 2-318:2.
31. Id. at § 2-318:1.
32. Id. at § 2-318:2.
33. Id.
34. id.
35. AM. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. 3d § 21:12 (1987).
36. § 2-318, Alternative A.
37. See Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 57-58 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
38. § 2-318, Alternative A.
39. § 2-318 cmt. 1.
[Vol. 29:3:721
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"reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods."4
A prevalent discrepancy among Alternative A jurisdictions is whether
warranty coverage should expand beyond the list of persons expressly in-
cluded in the text of Alternative A.4" A compelling justification for this dis-
crepancy is found in the ambiguous language of Official Comment 3.42 The
problematic language of Official Comment 3 that leads courts to different
interpretations is as follows:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain.43
Jurisdictions that take a strict construction approach to interpreting sec-
tion 2-318 only extend warranty protection to the purchaser's family, house-
hold, and guests since "adoption of Alternative A by the legislature indicates
a conscious decision to limit the seller's liability for breach of warranty to
the specific classes enumerated therein. 4 4 These jurisdictions interpret Offi-
cial Comment 3 "as an exhaustive list of the non[-]purchasers whom the
drafters have freed from the privity requirement."45  Therefore, in giving
such a narrow reading of the section, these jurisdictions have held that nei-
ther employees 46 nor innocent bystanders 47 can recover as third-party benefi-
ciaries to a seller's warranty.
40. § 2-318, Alternative A. See McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563,
566-67 (Fla. 1962) (holding that a minor who was injured on playground equipment pur-
chased by his father was "a naturally intended and reasonably contemplated beneficiary of the
warranty of fitness for use or merchantability implied by law" since the father purchased the
equipment for the son's use).
41. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1257.
42. Id.
43. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
44. 63 AM. JuR. 2DProducts Liability § 751 (1996).
45. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1257.
46. 3A LAWRENCE, supra note 23, at 344. Employees are protected under both Altema-
tive B and Alternative C if it is reasonable to expect the employee to "use, consume or be
affected by the goods" since Alternative B extends this coverage to any natural person and
Alternative C extends such coverage to anyone. Id. at 324. Therefore, privity of contract
between the employer and those in vertical distribution is irrelevant in jurisdictions adopting
Alternatives B or C, and employees are generally deemed third-party beneficiaries. Id. at 326.
47. See Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 924, 930-31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding a church member, who was injured while trapped inside a freezer in the church, was
2005]
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In contrast to the strict construction approach, jurisdictions relying on
the phrase "[b]eyond this, the section in this form is neutral" of Official
Comment 348 have held "the coverage of UCC [section] 2-3 18 may be ex-
panded beyond that adopted by the legislature."49 Since the phrase "[b]eyond
this" could be interpreted to refer to the purchaser's family, household, and
guests, the "neutral" clause could mean the Code is impartial to expanding
the class of plaintiffs who can qualify for warranty protection further than the
enumerated list.50  Therefore, Official Comment 3 could be interpreted to
mean the buyer's family members, household, and houseguests are the
minimum class of non-privity plaintiffs who are afforded warranty protec-
tion, but developments in case law will not limit the expansion of horizontal
privity." Additionally, the Code's failure to define the term "distributive
chain" in section 2-10352 creates an ambiguity as to whether the section is
"neutral" in expanding vertical or horizontal privity.53 Employees have also
been denied standing in a warranty action if their injuries were covered by
worker's compensation54 or if the court dismissed their action because they
could recover under the theories of negligence or strict tort liability.55
not entitled to maintain a breach of implied warranty cause of action because plaintiff was
neither a member of the church's "family," "household," or a guest in the church's home since
a church is not considered a home and does not have a "family" or "household").
48. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
49. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 752 (1996). See Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., 505 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (D. Conn. 1981). The Quadrini panel stated: "This court is not
persuaded that the adoption of Alternative A ... evinces a clear legislative intent to preclude
all other persons but those in the family, household, or a guest from seeking warranty cover-
age." Id. This holding was especially accurate in light of an amendment to U.C.C. section 2-
318 when the court stated "[t]his section is neutral with respect to case law or statutory law
extending warranties for personal injuries to other persons." Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §
42a-2-318 (1996)).
50. Walter K. Swartzkopf, Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 DICK. L. REv. 444,451 (1964).
51. Id.
52. § 2-103 (1999).
53. Stallworth, supra note 21, at 1258.
54. See Sutton v. Major Prods. Co., 372 S.E.2d 897, 899 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
55. See Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975). Strict tort liability in a
products liability action is governed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, which
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
[Vol. 29:3:721
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 672.318 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
Out of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative A,
only Florida has expressly expanded the enumerated class of Alternative A to
include employees in section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes. 6 Section
672.318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his or her
buyer, who is a guest in his or her home or who is an employee,
servant or agent of his or her buyer if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude nor limit the operation of this section.
57
Although section 672.318 extends warranty coverage beyond the
buyer's family, household, or houseguests, issues of privity regarding plain-
tiffs who are not expressly included in the statute are still decided on "a case
by case basis after a thorough analysis of the facts and considering what
would be a natural expansion of the law in this area. 58 Like other jurisdic-
tions that have adopted Alternative A, Florida courts rely on the Official
Code Comments of section 2-318 in considering whether privity should be
extended beyond the enumerated class. 9 Just as Alternative A only provides
warranty coverage to natural persons who have sustained a personal injury,
section 672.318 also denies corporations, businesses, or partnerships who
have suffered an economic loss the ability to sue as third-party beneficiaries
of contracts.6" Finally, the non-purchasing plaintiff must be a foreseeable
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
56. FLA. STAT. § 672.318 (2004); See generally STATE U.C.C. VARIATIONS, U.C.C. REP.
SERV. (West 1998).
57. § 672.318.
58. Barry v. Ivarson Inc., 249 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding lessees
of a residence who were injured by a table in that residence purchased by the lessors from the
defendant were not third-party beneficiaries since lessees were "not within the category of
third-party beneficiaries as contemplated in [Florida Statutes] § 672.318" and "there [was] a
question of foresecability").
59. Id.
60. See Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp., 929 F.2d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing a partnership was not a third-party beneficiary of contracts under Florida law and could
not recover economic damages for breach of warranty).
2005]
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user of the product to recover as a third-party beneficiary to a seller's war-
ranties.61
V. CASE LAW: JURISDICTIONS DENYING EMPLOYEES WARRANTY
COVERAGE
Not only are jurisdictions split regarding the issue of whether a pur-
chaser's employees should qualify as third-party beneficiaries to their seller's
warranties, but the courts differ regarding why this issue should be answered
in the negative. In Teel v. American Steel Foundries,6 2 the court, in applying
Missouri law, used a strict construction approach to Missouri's Alternative A
statute and held that an employee was neither in privity with the employer's
seller, nor within the class of enumerated persons the statute intended as a
third-party beneficiary.63 The court in Hester v. Purex Corp.64 used legisla-
tive intent for adopting Alternative A instead of Alternatives B or C, which
bars issues of horizontal privity altogether, and denied employees standing as
third-party beneficiaries to their employers' warranties. 65 The Hester court
further held that employees are not without a remedy and could recover un-
der the theories of negligence or strict tort liability. 66 Further, the court in
Sutton v. Major Products Co.67 held that a grocery store employee was barred
from bringing a breach of warranty suit against a manufacturer because she
was covered under worker's compensation insurance.6 8
A. Teel v. American Steel Foundries
The court in Teel faced an issue of first impression-specifically, whether
horizontal privity can be expanded beyond the buyer's family members,
household, or houseguests, in Missouri.69 The plaintiff in Teel was injured
when a defective wheel on the tractor he was operating disengaged the trailer
from the tractor, causing him to lose control and crash.7" Consequently, he
sued to recover as a third-party beneficiary to the contracts between his em-
ployer and the seller of the tractor containing the defective wheel, and be-
61. McCarthy v. Fla. Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
62. 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
63. Id. at 345-46.
64. 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Id.
67. 372 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
68. Id. at 899.
69. Teel, 529 F. Supp at 345.
70. Id. at 340.
[Vol. 29:3:721
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tween his employer and the manufacturer of the wheel.7 The defendants
moved to dismiss due to lack of privity.
7 2
Missouri's Legislature has adopted Alternative A verbatim in creating
section 400.2-318 of the Missouri Statutes, which "allows recovery to a very
limited class of non-privity parties. 7 3 The plaintiff insisted that the court
ignore the privity issue and follow the decision in Groppel Co. v. United
States Gypsum Co., where a remote purchaser was able to recover against a
manufacturer based on implied warranties.75 The plaintiff in Groppel Co.
sued the manufacturer of a fireproofing material and a company that in-
spected and approved the product in their published bulletin for economic
losses resulting from extra time and costs spent on re-applying the material
to a building.76 After reasoning that Official Comment 3 of section 2-318
allows the courts to make an exception to the privity requirement, the court
in Groppel Co. noted that other jurisdictions interpreting Alternative A have
held:
[T]he statute speaks only about "horizontal privity" (who, besides
the purchaser, has a right of action against the manufacturer or
seller of a defective product), and is silent on the question of "ver-
tical privity" (who, besides the immediate seller, is liable to the
consumer for damages caused by the defective product) ... [t]here
thus is nothing to prevent this court from joining in the growing
number of jurisdictions which, although bound by the code, have
nevertheless abolished vertical privity in breach of warranty
cases.
77
Based upon such reasoning, the court in Groppel Co. held that implied war-
ranties could extend to remote purchasers.78
Since Groppel Co. decided an issue of vertical privity in extending war-
ranty protection to remote purchasers, and not an issue of horizontal privity,
the court in Teel ignored the plaintiffs contention and held that Groppel Co.
was not authoritative in deciding whether a seller's warranties should extend
71. Id. at344.
72. Id. at 343.
73. Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (referring to
family members, household members and houseguests of the buyer).
74. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id. at 53-54.
77. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 855 (Pa. 1968)).
78. Id. at 58.
2005]
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to non-purchasers who are not enumerated in Alternative A.79 Since "Mis-
souri courts have never specifically interpreted section 2-318 with regard to
the class of persons who may be considered in horizontal privity with the
seller," there was no established case law addressing whether a purchaser's
employee can recover as a third-party beneficiary under section 2-318, Al-
ternative A.8" Without governing case law, the court looked to other factors
indicating legislative intent to resolve the issue.8"
Based upon the express language of section 400.2-318 extending war-
ranty protection to the buyer's family, household members, or guests in his
home, the court found "nothing in the express wording of this section to in-
dicate that an employee of a buyer may benefit from the seller's warranty. 8 2
The court then looked to the Official Comment of section 400.2-318"3 and
found it "clearly expresses a legislative intent to limit the class of third party
beneficiaries of the seller's warranty to the class of persons specifically enu-
merated in the statute. 84 Further, the court held "the very fact that the Mis-
souri legislature enacted Alternative A, rather than the more expansive Al-
ternatives B or C provides further indicia of this intent." 5 Finally, the court
looked to other jurisdictions that adopted Alternative A to prevent employees
from recovering for injuries caused by a product purchased by their em-
ployer.86 Ultimately, the court held "the express wording of § 400.2-318 and
the legislative intent implied by the comments to the statute must control.
Had the Missouri legislature intended broader coverage by the UCC they
79. Groppel Co., 616 S.W.2d at 58; Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345
(E.D. Mo. 1981).
80. Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Comment states: "Missouri courts have required privity in warranty cases
which involve goods other than food and drink. The food and drink decisions are distin-
guished on the basis of the nature of the product and do not depend upon a family or house-
hold relationship between the injured person and the purchaser." Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 400.2-318 (1965)).
84. Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Weaver v. Ralston Motor Hotel, Inc., 218 S.E.2d 260, 262-263 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1975); Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975); Colvin v. FMC Corp.,
604 P.2d 157, 160 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)). The court also quoted the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's interpretation of § 2-318, Alternative A, which stated:
[Ilt is not the duty of the courts to amend the statute where the Legislature has spoken. There-
fore, under New Jersey law the statutory breach of warranty claims would not be available to
[defendant] or to any party other than the contract purchaser, or the limited class set forth in §
2-318.
Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 326 A.2d 90, 95 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974)).
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could have enacted either Alternative B or C to § 2-31 8." The plaintiff was
held to not be in privity with the defendants and was deprived of the ability
to bring a breach of warranty action. 8
B. Hester v. Purex Corp.
In Hester v. Purex Corp., the appellant sustained permanent injuries to
his central nervous system after inhaling fumes of a cleaning solvent during
the course of his employment. 89 Due to his injuries, the appellant sued the
manufacturer of the solvent that sold the product to his employer.9" The ap-
pellant maintained that the manufacturer breached the implied warranty of
merchantability because the cleaning solvent was not fit and safe for its in-
tended purpose of cleaning.9 The trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss and plaintiff appealed. 9 The issue on appeal was whether warranty
protection extends to the purchaser's employees.93 The appellant sought to
magnify the language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, which states:
"'the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law.', 94 Based on the Official Comment, the appellant's position
was that "section 2-3 18 should be construed liberally so as to include any
foreseeable or intended users such as employees of the buyer."95 To support
his contention, he argued "that an employee is a member of the 'business
family or household"' 96 as established in Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom.97
In Newsom, the jury awarded the appellee-plaintiff damages for injuries
sustained from an industrial incident when the shank of a stud being attached
to wood by a fellow workman ricocheted through the wood and hit the plain-
tiff in the head while he was working as a carpenter foreman.98 The plaintiff
brought suit against the manufacturer of the stud on the theories of breach of
express and implied warranties.99 There was no privity issue regarding the
87. Teel, 529 F. Supp. at 345.
88. Id. at 345-46.
89. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Okla. 1973).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hester, 534 P.2d at 1308 (quoting 12A O.S. 1971 § 2-318 cmt. 3) (current version at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (2004)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
98. Id. at 396.
99. Id.
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breach of express warranty since the plaintiff had read pamphlets describing
the studs, and therefore representations regarding the studs were made di-
rectly to him.'00 However, the express warranty claim was dismissed be-
cause the plaintiff did not buy the studs, and there is nothing in the record
proving the employer "relied on any statement in the pamphlet" when pur-
chasing the studs.'' As to the breach of implied warranty claim, the court in
Newsom held an "employee stands in the shoes of his employer and that his
cause of action based on implied warranty is not barred by the shield of priv-
ity."' 2 The court reasoned that manufacturers are aware of the fact that pur-
chaser's employees will use the product since most business activities are
performed by employees. 10 3 Without an Oklahoma case proving otherwise,
the court was "satisfied that the employee may sue on the theory of implied
warranty."' 4 The court relied on expert testimony proving the separation of
the head from the shank of the stud was due to a manufacturing defect'0 5
causing that stud to become weaker. 106 The court found enough evidence to
find the manufacturer liable based on the theory of manufacturer's liabil-
ity.107
Since Newsom was decided on a theory of products liability, the court in
Hester dismissed the appellant's contention because "'[t]he UCC has to do
with commercial transactions and presupposes a buyer in privity with a
seller, the concept being extended only as provided by the Legislature."" 10
8
Since Oklahoma has adopted Alternative A, and has not adopted Alternatives
B or C to expand the realm of warranty coverage, the court held a pur-
chaser's employees were not protected under section 2-318 until the legisla-
ture changes the statute. 09 However, the court reasoned that injured employ-
ees could still maintain a cause of action and recover under the theories of
negligence and strict products liability."0
100. Id. at 397.
101. Id.
102. Newsom, 382 F.2d at 398.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 399. A manufacturing defect is "[a]n imperfection in a product that departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in its assembly and mar-
keting." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (8th ed. 2004).
106. Newsom, 382 F.2d at 399.
107. Id.
108. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975) (quoting Moss v. Polyco,
Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 625 (Okla. 1974)).
109. Id.
110. Id. See generally Kirkland v. G.M. Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
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C. Sutton v. Major Products Co.
In Sutton v. Major Products Co.,' a grocery store employee appealed a
summary judgment entered in favor of a manufacturer and distributors of a
potato whitener containing sodium bisulfate."' Plaintiff brought a cause of
action alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability against both
the manufacturer and distributors of the potato whitener for injuries sustained
from inhaling the noxious fumes of the whitener.1 3 However, section 99B-
2(b) of the General Statutes of North Carolina lists as a claimant for a breach
of implied warranty of merchantability "a buyer, a member or guest of a
member of the family of the buyer, a guest of the buyer, or an employee of
the buyer not covered by worker's compensation insurance.""' 4 Therefore,
the potential class of plaintiffs who can sue a manufacturer for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability is limited."5 The court interpreted the
statute to restrict the class of potential plaintiffs in a products liability action
against those in the vertical chain of distribution for breach of implied war-
ranties.'16 Here, the plaintiff's employer purchased the product for use in the
store; the plaintiff used the whitener during the course of her employment;
and the plaintiffs injury was covered under the Worker's Compensation
Act." 7 Therefore, she was barred from bringing a breach of implied war-
ranty action against the defendants, and the court upheld the summary judg-
ment in favor of the manufacturer." 8
VI. CASE LAW: JURISDICTIONS EXTENDING WARRANTY PROTECTION TO
EMPLOYEES
Just as jurisdictions deny employees warranty coverage under section 2-
318, Alternative A for various reasons, jurisdictions are also split concerning
why employees should have standing to sue as third-party beneficiaries to a
seller's warranties. 9 In Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 20 the court
111. 372 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id. at 898.
113. Id.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B- 2(b) (2003); Sutton, 372 S.E.2d at 899.
115. See Sutton, 372 S.E.2d at 899.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See e.g., Carlson v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla.
1987); Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591 (I11. App. Ct. 1987); McNally v.
Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
120. 509 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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interpreted Official Comment 3 to allow the judiciary to decide issues of
horizontal privity and extend warranty coverage beyond the enumerated class
of Alternative A.12 ' However, the court conditioned its extension of privity
by only extending third-party beneficiary standing to a purchaser's employ-
ees if the employee's safety in using the goods formed part of the basis of the
bargain between the employer and seller.122 In McNally v. Nicholson Manu-
facturing Co.,123 the Supreme Court of Maine interpreted the Official Com-
ment to section 2-313 and analyzed section 2-318 to establish that courts
have the power to resolve issues of horizontal privity and extend warranty
protection beyond the enumerated class of Alternative A.' 24 Further, the
court reasoned that employees of a corporate purchaser qualify as members
of the corporate "family," thus allowing them to fall within the protected
class of warranty beneficiaries. 25 In Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries,
Inc., 12 an employee was able to bring a breach of warranty action against a
manufacturer because the language of section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes
expressly includes employees within the enumerated class of intended third-
party beneficiaries. 1
27
A. Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co.
In Whitaker, an employee brought suit to recover for injuries sustained
during the course of his employment while working with a bandsaw that was
purchased by his employer. 128 The plaintiff sought to recover against the
manufacturer, importer, and seller of the bandsaw for breach of implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 29 The plain-
tiffs complaint alleged that the defendants knew his employer bought the
handsaw to cut bar stock. 3° After the trial court granted both the importer's
and seller's motions to dismiss the breach of warranties claims due to the
plaintiff's lack of privity, the plaintiff appealed.' 3
The issue on appeal, which had not been specifically ruled on below,
was whether an ultimate purchaser's employee could recover from the seller
121. Id. at 594.
122. Id. at 595.
123. 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
124. Id. at 919-20.
125. Id. at 921.
126. 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
127. Id. at 1077.
128. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 592.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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for breach of warranty. 13 2 The defendants argued that the plaintiff was not
among the class of intended beneficiaries enumerated in Alternative A.'33
The court responded by stating that the enumerated class of Alternative A is
not a limitation on potential plaintiffs since the language and commentary of
section 2-318 proves "'that the requirement of privity between the purchaser
and remote manufacturer is not established."" 34 The defendants argued sec-
tion 2-318 restricts those in horizontal privity from recovering for breach of
warranty but does not affect those in vertical privity.135 Further, the defen-
dants stated the Illinois Legislature's decision to adopt Alternative A estab-
lishes their intention to deny employees the right to recover as third-party
beneficiaries to a seller's warranties made to their employer, since employees
"would clearly be allowed to recover for breach of warranty under alterna-
tives B and C.",
13 6
Relying on Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, the court held the
statute was not restricted by developing case law concerning issues of hori-
zontal privity. 13 7 Additionally, the court relied on the Official Comment to
section 2-313138 and found "the 'purpose of the law of warranty is to deter-
mine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell ... and to hold the
seller liable if he has failed to supply goods of the agreed upon quality.'
139
132. Id. at 592.
133. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 593. The defendants relied on In re Johns-Manville Asbes-
tosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that Illinois courts have not
allowed a plaintiff who is outside the class of persons enumerated within section 2-318 the
right to recover for breach of warranty) and Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685, 693 (S.D.
Ill. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff cannot recover as a functional equivalent to family members
or guests, and the legislature's adoption of the most narrowly worded alternative proves their
intent to bar such plaintiffs from recovery). Id.
134. Id. (quoting Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 309 N.E.2d 550, 556 (Ill. 1974)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 593-94.
137. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594.
138. U.C.C. section 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2001).
139. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 594 (quoting § 2-313 cmt. 4).
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The court then explained that a seller expressly warrants if he makes "'any
affirmation of fact or promise.. . to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain."",140 The court reasoned that section
2-318 creates a conclusive presumption that a purchaser who bargained for a
warranty of safety sought the warranty on behalf of himself and the enumer-
ated class of third-party beneficiaries "'if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods."" 4' Therefore, both
express and implied warranties were found to form "part of the basis of any
bargain in the trade.' 42 Thus, the court held:
[T]he warranty extends to any employee of a purchaser who is in-
jured in the use of the goods, as long as the safety of that employee
in the use of the goods was either explicitly or implicitly part of
the basis of the bargain when the employer purchased the goods. 143
In applying the facts of the case, the court held that the bandsaw the
plaintiffs employer bought from defendants did not conform to its implied
warranty of merchantability or its implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.' 44 In bargaining for a safe, merchantable bandsaw, the plaintiffs
employer "sought the safety on behalf of its employees who were to use the
saw [since a] corporation cannot use the bandsaw at all unless its employees
operate it.' ' 145 Therefore, the court held the defendants either expressly or
impliedly warranted that the bandsaw was safe for the plaintiffs use, thus
enabling the plaintiff to bring an action for breach of warranty.146
B. McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co.
In McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co., 47 the Supreme Court of
Maine relied on policy arguments and its interpretation of official code
comments in holding that an employee who was required to be in close prox-
imity of a machine during the course of his employment was a beneficiary of
140. Id. The court quoted ILL. REv. STAT. § 2-313 (1985), which was replaced by 810 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-313(a) (1993).
141. Id. at 595 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. 1985 Ch. 26, 2-318 (current version at 810 ILL.
COM. STAT. 5/2-318 (2004)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Whitaker, 509 N.E.2d at 595.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
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the warranties given to his employer by a manufacturer.'48 The plaintiff was
injured during the course of his employment while operating a skidder,
which transfers logs into a chipping machine that grinds them into chips used
for making pulp and paper.1 49 Plaintiff brought a breach of warranty action
against the manufacturer of the skidder due to injuries sustained from a piece
of wood forcefully flying out of a side opening and striking him in the
head. 5 ° The plaintiff alleged the defendant's publication, advertising, and
interviews created an express warranty to the plaintiff's employer since the
skidder was represented to be safely made for its intended purpose. 5' Plain-
tiff further alleged the defendant created the implied warranty of merchant-
ability by selling the chipper to his employer.'52 However, the superior court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted because the plaintiff, as the purchaser's employee, was
not in privity of contract with the defendant.'53
In reversing the ruling of the lower court, the Supreme Court of Maine
first noted the trend of other jurisdictions that relaxed or deserted privity
requirements in a breach of warranty action. 54 This was the first case to
come before the court on the issue of horizontal privity, which had "no inter-
vening attention to the problem by the Maine Legislature."'55 The court ana-
lyzed the differences between vertical and horizontal privity, and found:
These "horizontal" relationships to the last purchaser were de-
scribed in Section 2-318 in terms of: (1) a "natural person" "in-
jured in [his] person by breach of the warranty", (2) who is "in the
family or household" or "a guest in... [the] home" of the last pur-
chaser and (3) who "it is reasonable to expect" is a "person [who]
may use, consume or be affected by the goods .... 156
Except for being a member of the ultimate purchaser's family, house-
hold, or a houseguest of the ultimate purchaser, the court found the plaintiff
met the criteria required to bring a breach of warranty action under section 2-
318, since he was a natural person who was personally injured and it was
148. Id. at 921.
149. Id. at 914.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. McNally, 313 A.2d at 914.
153. Id. at 916.
154. Id. at 916-17.
155. Id. at 917.
156. Id. at 918 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318 (1999)) (alteration in original).
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reasonable to expect for him to use or be affected by the machine. 5 7 There-
fore, the issue on appeal was whether the section's express inclusion of the
enumerated class of beneficiaries in horizontal privity with the ultimate pur-
chaser should "be given a strictly literal interpretation which excludes any
other relationship no matter how closely akin, policy-wise. ' ' 5
Interpreting the language of Official Comment 3 to section 2-318, the
court found the section was impartial "beyond" the enumerated class, and
such neutrality was attributed to developing issues of vertical privity. 59
However, since the court found section 2-318 only addressed issues of hori-
zontal privity, the court relied on Official Comment 2 to section 2-313 to
find the correct judicial interpretation of section 2-318.160 The text of Offi-
cial Comment 2 to section 2-313 that addresses section 2-318 states:
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries ex-
pressly recognizes this case law development within one particular
area. Beyond that, the matter [of lack of privity] is left to the case
law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.16 1
The court reasoned the phrase "particular area" addressed by section 2-
318 should be interpreted in regards to non-purchasing parties in horizontal
relationships with the ultimate purchaser and their ability to recover against a
seller's breach of warranty. 62 Therefore, the court interpreted the Official
Comment to section 2-313 to mean that the "policies" of section 2-318
should provide "'useful guidance [for] further cases as they arise"' in resolv-
ing issues of horizontal privity. 163 Based on this interpretation, the court
concluded that the correct judicial approach to resolving issues of horizontal
privity should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and policy supports
that non-purchasing parties could be regarded as functional equivalents to
those specifically enumerated in Alternative A."6
Since it must be reasonable to expect non-purchasing parties to 'use,
consume or be affected by the goods"' in order to gain third-party benefici-
ary standing, the court held the ultimate purchaser would want those who are
expected to come in contact with the goods to have the same warranty pro-
157. McNally, 313 A.2d at 918.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 920.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 919-920 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (2001)) (emphasis in original).
162. McNally, 313 A.2d at 920.
163. Id. (citing § 2-313 cmt. 2).
164. Id. at 920.
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tection a seller has given to him. 6 5 Therefore, the plaintiff, who was em-
ployed by the ultimate purchaser and required to work in close proximately
with the skidder during the course of his employment, was held to be a bene-
ficiary of the warranties given to his employer. 166 Thus, the employer would
want the plaintiff to be a beneficiary of his seller's warranties regarding the
fitness and safety of the chipper. 167 Further, the court gave a figurative inter-
pretation to the word "family" to allow the plaintiff to fall within the enu-
merated class of Alternative A since employees are seen as members of the
corporate "family."' 68 Consequently, an ultimate purchaser's employee was
a third-party beneficiary to a seller's warranty under section 2-31 8.169
C. Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
In Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,170 the plaintiff con-
tracted pleural disease from exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers
during the course of his employment as a painter.17' The plaintiff brought a
breach of warranty action against defendants who mined, manufactured, and
distributed asbestos-containing products. 172 The defendants moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
173
Section 672.318 of the Florida Statutes expressly extends warranty
coverage to a purchaser's employee. 174 Since the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants sold the product to either the plaintiff, his employer, or others
who had knowledge that the plaintiff would be exposed to the product, the
court found that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability between the defendant and the plaintiffs em-
ployer.175 "Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss . . . [was] denied.' 176
165. Id. at 921 (quoting § 2-318).
166. Id.
167. McNally, 313 A.2d at 921 (citing Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885, 893
(Ark. 1964)).
168. Id. Contra Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that the employer-employee relationship does not fall within the defmi-
tion of "family" under Alternative A).
169. McNally, 313 A.2d at 923.
170. 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
171. Id. at 1075.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1077.
175. Carlson, 693 F. Supp. at 1078.
176. Id. However, in Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 309 So. 2d 69, 73 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held:
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although the purpose of section 2-318 was "to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions," 17 the states have only achieved uniformity
in deciding issues of vertical privity by allowing purchasers to sue any party
involved in the chain of selling a product. 178 Consequently, there remains a
divergence among Alternative A jurisdictions resolving issues of horizontal
privity.179 Jurisdictions are split in deciding whether third-party beneficiary
standing should extend beyond the buyer's family, household, or house-
guests. This inconsistency is substantially attributed to the ambiguous lan-
guage of Official Code Comment 3 to section 2-318. The commentary states
that Alternative A gives beneficiary status to "the family, household and
guests of the purchaser,"'8 ° but directly follows this phrase by stating the
section is "neutral" beyond the category of third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters and does not intend "to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law ' in regards to extending warranty protection to "other persons
in the distributive chain."182 However, the Code's failure to provide a defini-
tion of the term "distributive chain" has left the term open for judicial inter-
pretation. 83 Therefore, if a court interprets the "distributive chain" to refer
only to issues of vertical privity, an employee will be barred from bringing a
breach of warranty action since they were not a purchaser.184 On the other
hand, if a court interprets the "distributive chain" in relation to extending
warranty protection horizontally, an employee is more likely to recover since
the court is not "restricted" to only protect the enumerated class.185 The
Code's use of such vague language presents each state's judiciary with the
opportunity to interpret its meaning differently.
An automobile parts store employee, who was injured when the wheel assembly of a truck
owned by one of the defendants exploded during the mounting of a tire, was not considered a
third-party beneficiary of the truck manufacturer's implied warranty to that defendant, despite
an allegation that the store was the defendant's agent, where the store had simply been engaged
to change the truck's tires, where there was no agency relationship between the defendant and
the store, and where there was no direct employment relationship between the defendant and
the injured employee.
41A FLA. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 51 (2004) (citing Favors, 309 So. 2d at 73).
177. 1 HAWKLAND, supranote 5, at § 2-318:l.
178. See Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
179. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 5, at § 2-318:1.
180. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (2001).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. § 2-103.
184. See Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
185. See McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973).
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Although the issue of extending warranty coverage could be decided ei-
ther way, the fact that the Code failed to provide a definition for "distributive
chain" and used the phrase in a section attempting to resolve privity issues
seems to support the section's neutrality concerning both vertical and hori-
zontal privity. The drafters' express inclusion of the buyer's family, house-
hold, and houseguests as beneficiaries only proves their disposition toward
extending warranty protection to this enumerated class. The phrase "beyond
this, the section in this form is neutral," '186 should be construed to mean the
section is impartial regarding whether other non-purchasers should have
standing to sue on warranty claims.
Jurisdictions that view the category of third-party beneficiaries contem-
plated by the drafters as an exhaustive list of beneficiaries are contradicted
by the language of the commentary. Regardless of whether "distributive
chain" refers to issues of vertical or horizontal privity, the text of Official
Comment 3 says the section is neutral beyond giving the enumerated class
warranty coverage, and the section is not a restraint on developing case law
regarding "whether the seller's warranties ... extend to other persons in the
distributive chain." '187 Therefore, the drafters recognized new privity issues
may arise in a state's judiciary after its legislature enacted Alternative A.
Thus, the drafters left future privity issues for the courts' determination on a
case-by-case basis.188 Therefore, jurisdictions denying employees standing
as third-party beneficiaries because they are not among the enumerated class
seem to be using flawed reasoning. These jurisdictions rely heavily on their
legislative intent for adopting Alternative A. However, in adopting this al-
ternative, the legislature is accepting the exact language of the entire alterna-
tive, including the commentary. By enacting Alternative A verbatim, it ap-
pears a state's legislature is also impartial as to whether warranty coverage
should extend beyond the purchaser's family, household, and houseguests
and intends for the courts to resolve this issue.
Further, denying warranty coverage to a purchaser's employees because
they are protected under the worker's compensation laws is questionable
public policy. If an employee who is injured during the course of his or her
employment by a defective product purchased by their employer can only
recover under a worker's compensation statute, they may be denied recovery
for emotional distress or pain and suffering. 189 Therefore, if the employer
who purchased the product was injured, they could recover far more against
186. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 610 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Conn. 1992) (cit-
ing Skitromo v. Meriden Yellow Cab Co., 528 A.2d 826, 827 (Conn. 1987)).
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a seller for their injuries than an employee who is injured by the same defec-
tive product and covered under worker's compensation.
In order to resolve the issue of whether employees should be third-party
beneficiaries to a seller's warranties, a state's legislature should follow the
Florida Legislature's lead and amend its version of Alternative A. By doing
so, the legislature will take the issue of extending warranty coverage to a
purchaser's employees out of the judiciary's hands, and the amendment will
create uniformity since the issue will no longer be decided on a case-by-case
basis. The statute could be amended to include employees without any
changes to the commentary, thus leaving remaining issues of privity for the
court's determination. Further, legislatures of jurisdictions that only intend
to give third-party beneficiary standing to the purchaser's family, household,
or houseguests can also resolve this issue by amending the statute to include
language stating the enumerated list is exhaustive. Although jurisdictions
may argue that a legislature's adoption of Alternative A instead of Alterna-
tives B or C proves that the legislature only intended warranty protection for
the enumerated class, giving such a narrow interpretation categorizes all
other non-purchasing parties together and collectively denies them the right
to bring a breach of warranty action.
An employee, like a non-purchasing plaintiff who is in the family or
home of the purchaser, is a "natural person" who reasonably can be expected
to "use, consume or be affected by the goods."'1 90 For that reason, employees
should be viewed as functional equivalents to the enumerated class of Alter-
native A. 9 ' Manufacturers, distributors, and retailers expect a purchaser's
employee to use a product purchased by their employer for use during the
course of their employment. Basically, "[a] corporation cannot use the...
[product] at all unless its employees operate it."' 92 Therefore, jurisdictions
denying standing to all parties not expressly mentioned within the section
group employees with bystanders, who do not use the goods, and lessees,
who may not be contemplated at all by the seller.
In conclusion, the ambiguities of Official Comment 3 have allowed the
courts to reach different conclusions in deciding issues of privity. However,
it seems logical to construe the ambiguous language in relation to both verti-
cal and horizontal privity. In order to resolve the discrepancy among juris-
dictions, a state's legislature should take action by amending its state's statu-
tory version of Alternative A to include employees within the class of pro-
tected beneficiaries. As it stands, leaving issues of privity for the courts to
190. § 2-318, Alternative A.
191. McNally, 313 A.2d at 920.
192. Whitaker v. Lian Feng Mach. Co., 509 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
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decide on a case by case basis will deny employees their right to recover for
injuries sustained from a defective product.
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